diff --git a/modules/tor/default.nix b/modules/tor/default.nix index 11b16af..ef8928a 100644 --- a/modules/tor/default.nix +++ b/modules/tor/default.nix @@ -24,6 +24,67 @@ }; }; + # https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators/#relay-operators_relay-bridge-overloaded + # https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025296.html + # https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=recommendations-network-performance-tuning + # https://github.com/Enkidu-6/tor-ddos + boot.kernel.sysctl = { + # Increase the maximum size of the network interface's receive queue, used + # to store received frames after removing them from the network adapter's + # ring buffer. High speed adapters should use a high value to prevent the + # queue from becoming full and dropping packets causing retransmits. + "net.core.netdev_max_backlog" = 262144; + # Increase TCP read/write buffers to enable scaling to a larger window + # size. Larger windows increase the amount of data to be transferred before + # an acknowledgement (ACK) is required. This reduces overall latencies and + # results in increased throughput. + "net.core.rmem_max" = 33554432; + "net.core.wmem_max" = 33554432; + "net.ipv4.tcp_rmem" = "4096 131072 33554432"; + "net.ipv4.tcp_wmem" = "4096 65536 33554432"; + # Reduce the length of time an orphaned connection will wait before it is + # aborted. For workloads or systems that generate or support high levels of + # network traffic, it can be advantageous to more aggressively reclaim dead + # or stale resources. + "net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout" = 10; + # Maximal number of TCP sockets not attached to any user file handle, held + # by system. If this number is exceeded orphaned connections are reset + # immediately and warning is printed. This limit exists only to prevent + # simple DoS attacks, you _must_ not rely on this or lower the limit + # artificially, but rather increase it (probably, after increasing + # installed memory), if network conditions require more than default value, + # and tune network services to linger and kill such states more + # aggressively. Let me to remind again: each orphan eats up to ~64K of + # unswappable memory. + "net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans" = 262144; + # Maximal number of timewait sockets held by system simultaneously. If this + # number is exceeded time-wait socket is immediately destroyed and warning + # is printed. This limit exists only to prevent simple DoS attacks, you + # _must_ not lower the limit artificially, but rather increase it + # (probably, after increasing installed memory), if network conditions + # require more than default value. + "net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets" = 2097152; + # In high traffic environments, sockets are created and destroyed at very + # high rates. This parameter, when set, allows "no longer needed" and + # "about to be destroyed" sockets to be used for new connections. When + # enabled, this parameter can bypass the allocation and initialization + # overhead normally associated with socket creation saving CPU cycles, + # system load and time. + "net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse" = 1; + # Aggressivelly check for and close broken connections + "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time" = 60; + "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes" = 3; + "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl" = 10; + # Increase the length of the SYN queue and socket listen() backlog to + # accommodate more connections waiting to connect. + "net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog" = 262144; + "net.core.somaxconn" = 32768; + # Expand local port range used for outgoing connections + "net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range" = "1025 65530"; + # Disable RFC1323 timestamps (TODO: why?) + "net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps" = 0; + }; + environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [ nyx # Command-line monitor for Tor ];