diff --git a/hosts/tor/tor.nix b/hosts/tor/tor.nix index d0cd091..ad1bd16 100644 --- a/hosts/tor/tor.nix +++ b/hosts/tor/tor.nix @@ -101,20 +101,20 @@ # to store received frames after removing them from the network adapter's # ring buffer. High speed adapters should use a high value to prevent the # queue from becoming full and dropping packets causing retransmits. - # "net.core.netdev_max_backlog" = 262144; + "net.core.netdev_max_backlog" = 262144; # Increase TCP read/write buffers to enable scaling to a larger window # size. Larger windows increase the amount of data to be transferred before # an acknowledgement (ACK) is required. This reduces overall latencies and # results in increased throughput. - # "net.core.rmem_max" = 33554432; - # "net.core.wmem_max" = 33554432; - # "net.ipv4.tcp_rmem" = "4096 131072 33554432"; - # "net.ipv4.tcp_wmem" = "4096 65536 33554432"; + "net.core.rmem_max" = 33554432; + "net.core.wmem_max" = 33554432; + "net.ipv4.tcp_rmem" = "4096 131072 33554432"; + "net.ipv4.tcp_wmem" = "4096 65536 33554432"; # Reduce the length of time an orphaned connection will wait before it is # aborted. For workloads or systems that generate or support high levels of # network traffic, it can be advantageous to more aggressively reclaim dead # or stale resources. - # "net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout" = 10; + "net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout" = 10; # Maximal number of TCP sockets not attached to any user file handle, held # by system. If this number is exceeded orphaned connections are reset # immediately and warning is printed. This limit exists only to prevent @@ -124,33 +124,33 @@ # and tune network services to linger and kill such states more # aggressively. Let me to remind again: each orphan eats up to ~64K of # unswappable memory. - # "net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans" = 262144; + "net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans" = 262144; # Maximal number of timewait sockets held by system simultaneously. If this # number is exceeded time-wait socket is immediately destroyed and warning # is printed. This limit exists only to prevent simple DoS attacks, you # _must_ not lower the limit artificially, but rather increase it # (probably, after increasing installed memory), if network conditions # require more than default value. - # "net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets" = 2097152; + "net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets" = 2097152; # In high traffic environments, sockets are created and destroyed at very # high rates. This parameter, when set, allows "no longer needed" and # "about to be destroyed" sockets to be used for new connections. When # enabled, this parameter can bypass the allocation and initialization # overhead normally associated with socket creation saving CPU cycles, # system load and time. - # "net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse" = 1; + "net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse" = 1; # Aggressivelly check for and close broken connections - # "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time" = 60; - # "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes" = 3; - # "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl" = 10; + "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time" = 60; + "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes" = 3; + "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl" = 10; # Increase the length of the SYN queue and socket listen() backlog to # accommodate more connections waiting to connect. - # "net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog" = 262144; - # "net.core.somaxconn" = 32768; + "net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog" = 262144; + "net.core.somaxconn" = 32768; # Expand local port range used for outgoing connections "net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range" = "1025 65530"; # Disable RFC1323 timestamps (TODO: why?) - # "net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps" = 0; + "net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps" = 0; }; # Mounting /var/lib/tor/ relies on the 'tor' user having the same static