unmodularise tor
This commit is contained in:
parent
f2b83151a9
commit
749a49d0ab
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@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
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../../overlays
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../../modules/base
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../../modules/server
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../../modules/tor
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./hardware.nix
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./network.nix
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./tor.nix
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@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
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{...}: {
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{
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config,
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pkgs,
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...
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}: {
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services.tor = {
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enable = true;
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openFirewall = true;
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relay = {
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enable = true;
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role = "exit";
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};
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settings = {
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Nickname = "DXV7520";
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ContactInfo = "admin@caspervk.net";
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ORPort = [
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{
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addr = "91.210.59.57";
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@ -12,6 +23,91 @@
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port = 443;
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}
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];
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ControlPort = 9051; # for nyx
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DirPort = 80;
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DirPortFrontPage = builtins.toFile "tor-exit-notice.html" (builtins.readFile ./tor-exit-notice.html);
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ExitRelay = true;
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IPv6Exit = true;
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ExitPolicy = [
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"reject *:25"
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"accept *:*"
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];
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};
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};
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# https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators/#relay-operators_relay-bridge-overloaded
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# https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025296.html
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# https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=recommendations-network-performance-tuning
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# https://github.com/Enkidu-6/tor-ddos
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boot.kernel.sysctl = {
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# Increase the maximum size of the network interface's receive queue, used
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# to store received frames after removing them from the network adapter's
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# ring buffer. High speed adapters should use a high value to prevent the
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# queue from becoming full and dropping packets causing retransmits.
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"net.core.netdev_max_backlog" = 262144;
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# Increase TCP read/write buffers to enable scaling to a larger window
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# size. Larger windows increase the amount of data to be transferred before
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# an acknowledgement (ACK) is required. This reduces overall latencies and
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# results in increased throughput.
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"net.core.rmem_max" = 33554432;
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"net.core.wmem_max" = 33554432;
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"net.ipv4.tcp_rmem" = "4096 131072 33554432";
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"net.ipv4.tcp_wmem" = "4096 65536 33554432";
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# Reduce the length of time an orphaned connection will wait before it is
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# aborted. For workloads or systems that generate or support high levels of
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# network traffic, it can be advantageous to more aggressively reclaim dead
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# or stale resources.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout" = 10;
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# Maximal number of TCP sockets not attached to any user file handle, held
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# by system. If this number is exceeded orphaned connections are reset
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# immediately and warning is printed. This limit exists only to prevent
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# simple DoS attacks, you _must_ not rely on this or lower the limit
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# artificially, but rather increase it (probably, after increasing
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# installed memory), if network conditions require more than default value,
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# and tune network services to linger and kill such states more
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# aggressively. Let me to remind again: each orphan eats up to ~64K of
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# unswappable memory.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans" = 262144;
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# Maximal number of timewait sockets held by system simultaneously. If this
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# number is exceeded time-wait socket is immediately destroyed and warning
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# is printed. This limit exists only to prevent simple DoS attacks, you
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# _must_ not lower the limit artificially, but rather increase it
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# (probably, after increasing installed memory), if network conditions
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# require more than default value.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets" = 2097152;
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# In high traffic environments, sockets are created and destroyed at very
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# high rates. This parameter, when set, allows "no longer needed" and
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# "about to be destroyed" sockets to be used for new connections. When
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# enabled, this parameter can bypass the allocation and initialization
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# overhead normally associated with socket creation saving CPU cycles,
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# system load and time.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse" = 1;
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# Aggressivelly check for and close broken connections
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"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time" = 60;
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"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes" = 3;
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"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl" = 10;
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# Increase the length of the SYN queue and socket listen() backlog to
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# accommodate more connections waiting to connect.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog" = 262144;
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"net.core.somaxconn" = 32768;
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# Expand local port range used for outgoing connections
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"net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range" = "1025 65530";
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# Disable RFC1323 timestamps (TODO: why?)
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"net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps" = 0;
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};
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environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
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nyx # Command-line monitor for Tor
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];
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environment.persistence."/nix/persist" = {
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directories = [
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{
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directory = "/var/lib/tor";
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user = "tor";
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group = "tor";
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mode = "0700";
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}
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];
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};
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}
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@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
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{
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config,
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pkgs,
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...
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}: {
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services.tor = {
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enable = true;
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openFirewall = true;
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relay = {
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enable = true;
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role = "exit";
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};
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settings = {
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ContactInfo = "admin@caspervk.net";
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ControlPort = 9051; # for nyx
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DirPort = 80;
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DirPortFrontPage = builtins.toFile "tor-exit-notice.html" (builtins.readFile ./tor-exit-notice.html);
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ExitRelay = true;
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IPv6Exit = true;
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ExitPolicy = [
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"reject *:25"
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"accept *:*"
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];
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};
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};
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# https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators/#relay-operators_relay-bridge-overloaded
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# https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025296.html
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# https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=recommendations-network-performance-tuning
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# https://github.com/Enkidu-6/tor-ddos
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boot.kernel.sysctl = {
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# Increase the maximum size of the network interface's receive queue, used
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# to store received frames after removing them from the network adapter's
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# ring buffer. High speed adapters should use a high value to prevent the
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# queue from becoming full and dropping packets causing retransmits.
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"net.core.netdev_max_backlog" = 262144;
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# Increase TCP read/write buffers to enable scaling to a larger window
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# size. Larger windows increase the amount of data to be transferred before
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# an acknowledgement (ACK) is required. This reduces overall latencies and
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# results in increased throughput.
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"net.core.rmem_max" = 33554432;
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"net.core.wmem_max" = 33554432;
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"net.ipv4.tcp_rmem" = "4096 131072 33554432";
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"net.ipv4.tcp_wmem" = "4096 65536 33554432";
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# Reduce the length of time an orphaned connection will wait before it is
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# aborted. For workloads or systems that generate or support high levels of
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# network traffic, it can be advantageous to more aggressively reclaim dead
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# or stale resources.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout" = 10;
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# Maximal number of TCP sockets not attached to any user file handle, held
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# by system. If this number is exceeded orphaned connections are reset
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# immediately and warning is printed. This limit exists only to prevent
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# simple DoS attacks, you _must_ not rely on this or lower the limit
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# artificially, but rather increase it (probably, after increasing
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# installed memory), if network conditions require more than default value,
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# and tune network services to linger and kill such states more
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# aggressively. Let me to remind again: each orphan eats up to ~64K of
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# unswappable memory.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans" = 262144;
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# Maximal number of timewait sockets held by system simultaneously. If this
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# number is exceeded time-wait socket is immediately destroyed and warning
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# is printed. This limit exists only to prevent simple DoS attacks, you
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# _must_ not lower the limit artificially, but rather increase it
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# (probably, after increasing installed memory), if network conditions
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# require more than default value.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets" = 2097152;
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# In high traffic environments, sockets are created and destroyed at very
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# high rates. This parameter, when set, allows "no longer needed" and
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# "about to be destroyed" sockets to be used for new connections. When
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# enabled, this parameter can bypass the allocation and initialization
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# overhead normally associated with socket creation saving CPU cycles,
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# system load and time.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse" = 1;
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# Aggressivelly check for and close broken connections
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"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time" = 60;
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"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes" = 3;
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"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl" = 10;
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# Increase the length of the SYN queue and socket listen() backlog to
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# accommodate more connections waiting to connect.
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"net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog" = 262144;
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"net.core.somaxconn" = 32768;
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# Expand local port range used for outgoing connections
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"net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range" = "1025 65530";
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# Disable RFC1323 timestamps (TODO: why?)
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"net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps" = 0;
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};
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environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
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nyx # Command-line monitor for Tor
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];
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environment.persistence."/nix/persist" = {
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directories = [
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{
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directory = "/var/lib/tor";
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user = "tor";
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group = "tor";
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mode = "0700";
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}
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];
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};
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}
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